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Internationally, curricular guidelines for psychology recognise the scientific nature of the discipline, 
a position that is sometimes at odds with students’ expectations and interests. Students’ appreciation of 
psychology as a science increases with experience of the subject. However, students bring to the study 
of psychology a range of popular psychological misconceptions that often remain intact through their 
studies. The study described in this chapter examined endorsement of psychology-related 
misconceptions and anti-scientific views in students at different stages in their degree studies, as well 
as attitude towards psychology as a science. 
 Three groups of undergraduate students completed measures of false beliefs approximately 
midway through the academic year. One group had studied psychology for four months (n=83), another 
for 18 months (n=55), and the third for 30 months (n=40).  The results showed greater appreciation of 
psychology as a science by those with more experience of the subject, but no relationship between 
appreciation of psychology as a science and endorsement of misconceptions. Furthermore, some common 
misconceptions continued to be endorsed even after significant experience of psychology. This suggests 
that while students agree that psychology is a science, the core scientific values that would allow them 
to critically assess the basis for their own beliefs have not yet been fully adopted. These findings 
concur with research showing that such erroneous beliefs are resistant to change and may need to be 
challenged and refuted directly by teachers.  
Brewer et al. (1993) noted that “the fundamental goal of education in psychology, from which all 
others follow, is to teach students to think as scientists about behaviour” (p.169). The ability to think 
about behaviour in a scientific manner requires the appreciation of psychology as a scientific discipline 
and the adoption of its disciplinary beliefs and values. Yet, graduating students who have completed 
their undergraduate training in psychology do not always appear to think as scientists about human 
behaviour (Amsel, 2009a).  
In a scientific discipline, learning is conceptualised as a rational activity, “concerned with ideas, 
their structure and evidence for them” (Posner, Strike, Hewson & Gertzog, 1982, p.212). Learning 
involves weighing up evidence so as to make a judgement about a particular idea – the ideas one brings 
to the learning context are therefore influential. Students attracted to psychology as a course choice 
often bring to their studies a set of beliefs that are not in keeping with those of the discipline (Holmes 
& Beins, 2009). It is not unusual for students entering a psychology course to harbour a range of 
misconceptions affecting core beliefs about the discipline (e.g., “psychology is just common sense”) as 
well as specific knowledge areas (e.g. “a good hypnotist can make people behave in ways they would 
not otherwise”). Because psychology’s subject matter considers issues of everyday experience that are 
subject to much discussion by the wider public and misrepresentation in the popular media (e.g., 
Lilienfeld, Lynn, Ruscio, & Beyerstein, 2010), the discipline is particularly vulnerable to such 
misconceptions. As Ewing et al. (2010, p.87), put it, “psychology’s problem is that it is interesting and 
imminently accessible to any armchair theorist. Everyone is an ‘expert’ in psychology.” Teaching 
psychology requires challenging this belief. 
Students come to psychology confident that they already possess some objective knowledge about 
its subject matter, the source of this knowledge being ‘common sense’ or ‘conventional wisdom’. The 
common-sense account of mind and behaviour, based on anecdote and subjective experience, is 
referred to as folk psychology (e.g. Dennett, 1971; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) and it is the antithesis 
of psychological science. As teachers of psychology, we find ourselves having to counter the idea that 
psychology is ‘common sense’ and to challenge students’ existing, deeply embedded and resistant 
ideas. The problem with common sense, as Lindgren and Harvey (1981) note, is that it lulls us into a 
false sense of security so that we overestimate our understanding of human behaviour.  
Much research has by now established that students bring misconceptions to their first psychology 
course (McKeachie, 1960; Vaughan, 1977; Gardner & Dalsing, 1986). The misconceptions that 
students of psychology harbour match those of the wider public. Claims such as “we only use 10% of 
our brains”, “listening to Mozart increases babies’ intelligence” and “subliminal messages can persuade 
people to buy products” appear, in one form or another, with alarming regularity in the popular media. 
Others (such as “a full moon causes bad behaviour” or “opposites attract”) are deeply ingrained in ‘folk 
wisdom’. In discussing the ‘10% of our brain’ myth, Stanovich (2010) quotes columnist Robert 
Samuelson’s (1994) term ‘psycho-fact’, referring to “beliefs that, though not supported by hard 
evidence, are taken as real because their constant repetition changes the way we experience life.” 
Samuelson was writing about the availability heuristic and risk perception (see Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973), but the term might be usefully employed more broadly to refer to misconceptions about 
psychological issues that are often repeated and come to be taken as fact, creating a ‘psychomythology’ 
that is resistant to counterevidence. Some of these ‘psycho-myths’ share the contagion of urban legends 
and chain letters, taking on the status of memes (Dawkins, 1989, p.186; Blackmore, 1999; Lynch, 
1996).  
Misconceptions affect learning in other disciplines, such as biology (e.g., Munson, 1994), physics 
(Clement, 1982) and chemistry, (Barker & Millar, 1999). Hammer (1996), writing on physics teaching, 
notes four features of misconceptions that affect learning of a discipline: misconceptions are strongly held 
and stable cognitive structures; they differ from expert conceptions; they affect a student’s 
understanding of scientific explanations; and they need to be eradicated if a student is to attain an expert 
understanding of the discipline. This is consistent with accounts of learning that highlight conceptual 
change (e.g., Posner et al., 1982). If central concepts of new learning are to replace current beliefs, 
those existing beliefs must be seen as unsatisfactory. In the case of psychology, there is much to be 
‘unlearned’ and teaching that elicits cognitive conflict may be necessary. Amsel (2009b) notes the need 
to go beyond knowledge transmission in teaching psychology and advocates metainstruction, teaching 
that aims to convey psychology’s beliefs and values and to transform the student’s identity as scientific 
students of behaviour.  
Teachers of psychology have an ethical responsibility to counter misinformation and 
misconceptions about the discipline (Ewing et al., 2010).  Teachers are cognizant of this duty, yet 
students completing their undergraduate study of psychology often leave with their misconceptions 
intact (e.g., McKeachie, 1960; Taylor & Kowalski, 2004; Vaughan, 1977). Our study set out to 
examine students’ beliefs about psychology at varying stages through their degree studies. We wanted 
to establish whether the appreciation of psychology as a scientific discipline increases with experience 
of the subject and whether misconceptions and erroneous beliefs about psychological phenomena 
change. If students come to appreciate psychology as a science, consistent with conceptual change 
approaches, one might hypothesise that they engage in more evaluation of their previously held ideas 
(some of which are misconceptions) and are motivated to change those that prove unsatisfactory. 
However, it may be the case that such beliefs are resistant to change in spite of a growing appreciation 
of psychology as a scientific endeavour.  
In order to address this question, we devised a set of misconceptions based on the existing literature 
which was administered along with the Psychology as Science Scale (PAS; Friedrich, 1996) and the 
Revised Paranormal Beliefs Scale (R-PBS; Tobacyk, 2004) as a measure of students’ anti-scientific 
beliefs. The PAS scale has been used in many studies and is a valid and reliable measure of belief 
about the scientific nature of the discipline which has been shown to predict psychology students’ 
examination performance (Friedrich, 1996). Several studies have shown that the tendency to see 
psychology as a science, as measured by PAS, increases with experience of psychology (Amsel, Baird, 
& Ashley, in press; Friedrich, 1996; Holmes & Beins, 2009).  
The PAS contains 15 statements about psychology which students rate from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
7 (strongly agree). Items include statements such as “research conducted in controlled laboratory 
settings is essential for understanding everyday behaviour” and “psychological research can enable us 
to anticipate people’s behaviour with a high degree of accuracy”. It directly addresses beliefs that must 
be adopted if someone is to become a scientific psychologist: that behaviour is predictable, that the 
causes of behaviour are not always subject to conscious awareness and that these can be measured 
objectively (Amsel, 2009a) and as such assesses core beliefs in psychology (Amsel, Johnston, 
Alvarado, Kettering, Rankin & Ward, 2009).  
The Revised Paranormal Beliefs Scale (R-PBS; Tobacyk, 2004) provides a measure of self-reported 
paranormal and religious beliefs. Respondents rate the degree of belief on a seven point scale for 26 
items. Tobacyk (2004) defines paranormal phenomena as “those that, if genuine, would violate basic 
limiting principles of science” (p.94); as such, belief in these phenomena is at odds with scientific 
thinking and scores on the R-PBS are treated here as a measure of ‘anti-scientific thinking’. For 
example, the scale includes statements such as: “psychokinesis, the movement of objects through 
psychic powers, does exist”; “some individuals are able to levitate (lift) objects through mental forces”; 
“astrology is a way to accurately predict the future”; “if you break a mirror, you will have bad luck”.  
Lange, Irwin and Houran (2000) produced a psychometrically improved version of the R-PBS which 
identifies two unidimensional clusters and avoids significant differential item functioning for age or 
gender. Scores using Lange et al.’s sub-scales, New Age Philosophy and Traditional Paranormal 
Beliefs, are also reported in the current study.  
The R-PBS is included here as a measure of anti-scientific thinking and therefore it was 
hypothesised that scores on its paranormal subscales would be associated with acceptance of 
psychology misconceptions. Studies have found that belief in paranormal phenomena is associated with 
lower performance on reasoning tasks (Hergovich & Arendasy, 2005; Wierzbicki, 1985) and on some 
measures of critical thinking (e.g., Gray & Mill, 1990; but see also Hergovich & Arendasy, 2005). 
Tobacyk and Milford (1983) reported correlations between the superstition and spiritualism subscales 
and a measure of irrational thinking.  
We devised a list of twenty psychology misconceptions which were presented along with six filler 
items. The list included items such as “we only use 10% of our brains”, “listening to Mozart increases 
babies’ intelligence”, and “behaviour is influenced by moon phases”. We defined misconceptions as 
psychological claims that are not supported by psychological research (see Amsel, Baird & Ashley, in 
press; Gardner & Dalsing, 1986; Taylor & Kowalski, 2004). These items were selected using a 
literature search on psychology misconceptions and we avoided items identified as ambiguous in 
previous studies (e.g., Brown, 1984; Gardner & Dalsing, 1986; Griggs & Ransdell, 1987; Ruble, 1986). 
The relatively small number of misconceptions reflects the difficulty in identifying reliable 
misconceptions across studies; Griggs and Ransdell (1987), for example, found only 15 across several 
studies reviewed (see also Brown, 1983).  By allowing students to rate on a 7-point scale the degree to 
which they agreed with each statement, we aimed to avoid problems associated with limiting answers 
with a true/false format (e.g., see Gardner & Dalsing, 1986). The use of a 7-point scale also ensured 
that the response format was the same on the three measures used.  
If students come to appreciate psychology as a science as their experience of the discipline grows, 
we would expect to find that students with more psychology experience produce greater PAS scores. If 
higher PAS scores are associated with lower rates of misconceptions and anti-scientific thinking, it 
would suggest that students are applying scientific thinking to a range of psychological phenomena. 
However, it may be that students can accept the scientific approach of the discipline without allowing 
their misconceptions to be undermined; in this case scores on the PAS may not be associated with 
performance on the misconceptions measure. A secondary aim of the study was to identify the most 
popular misconceptions, and affected knowledge areas, and thereby to identify areas of the psychology 
curriculum that might require additional attention or a focused pedagogical approach.  
Method 
Participants 
 
The sample consisted of 178 undergraduate students of psychology. Group 1 (n = 83) had studied 
psychology for four months. Twenty were men and 63 were women. Ages ranged from 18 to 47 years, 
with a median age of 19 years. Group 2 (n = 55) had studied psychology for 18 months; 14 were men 
and 36 were women; 5 did not state their gender. The age range for this group was from 18 to 55 years, 
with a median age of 20 years. Group 3 consisted of 40 students approaching their final examinations, 
having studied psychology for 30 months. Seven were men and 29 were women; 4 did not report 
gender. The age range for this group was 19 to 48 years, with a median age of 21 years. Students 
volunteered to participate in class, and did not receive course credit for participation.  
Measures  
Three measures were used: Friedrich’s (1996) Psychology as Science (PAS) scale, the Revised 
Paranormal Beliefs Scale (Tobacyk, 2004) and a psychology ‘misconceptions’ questionnaire.  
The PAS scale is designed to assess the degree to which psychology is viewed as similar to the 
natural sciences, that is “as deriving authority from an empirical research base addressing lawful, 
predictable phenomena” (Friedrich, 1996, p.12). The PAS contains 15 items such as “it’s just as 
important for psychology students to do experiments as it is for students of chemistry or biology” and 
“research conducted in controlled laboratory settings is essential for understanding everyday 
behaviour”. Respondents rate each statement on a seven point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). Seven items are reverse scored and 8 items are positive-scored; five filler items are 
included to obscure the purpose of the scale. Friedrich (1996) reported coefficient alphas in the range 
of .7 to .8 across several studies and a test-retest stability of r =.76. The PAS instructs respondents to 
rate the degree to which they agree or disagree with statements that “represent an opinion about 
psychology”. Respondents are told “you will probably agree with some of the statements and disagree 
with others; there are no correct or incorrect answers”.  
The Revised Paranormal Beliefs Scale (R-PBS; Tobacyk, 2004) provides a measure of self-reported 
paranormal and religious beliefs and consists of seven subscales: traditional religious belief; psi; 
witchcraft; superstition; spiritualism; extraordinary life forms; and precognition. Respondents rate the 
degree of belief on a seven point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) for 26 items. The 
paranormal beliefs were of interest here, as belief in these phenomena is at odds with scientific 
thinking. For example, endorsement of the psi items involves agreeing that “psychokinesis, the 
movement of objects through psychic powers, does exist” and “some individuals are able to levitate 
(lift) objects through mental forces”. The precognition items include statements such as “astrology is a 
way to accurately predict the future”. The superstition items include “black cats can bring bad luck” 
and “if you break a mirror, you will have bad luck”. Students who have adopted the core values and 
beliefs of psychology as a scientific discipline would not be expected to agree with such items.  We 
made one change to the R-PBS: the item “the abominable snowman of Tibet exists” was changed to 
“the yeti/ bigfoot exists” as piloting showed that some students were not familiar with the ‘abominable 
snowman’ but produced the term ‘bigfoot’ on explanation of the reference. The instructions of the R-
PBS tell respondents that “there are no right or wrong answers. This is a sample of your own beliefs 
and attitudes.” 
Lange et al. (2000) produced a psychometrically improved version of the R-PBS which identifies 
two unidimensional clusters and avoids significant differential item functioning for age or gender. 
Their method produces two subscales. New Age Philosophy, consisting of 11 items, is associated with 
‘paranormal abilities’ (reincarnation, altered states, astrology, and precognition). Traditional 
Paranormal Beliefs, consisting of five items, is associated with traditional supernatural concepts and 
contains items on traditional religious concepts (hell, devil) as well as witchcraft.  
In devising our psychology misconceptions questionnaire, we adapted items from several published 
sources (e.g., Griggs & Ransdell, 1987; Kowalski & Kujawski Taylor, 2009; Lilienfeld, Lynn, Ruscio & 
Beyerstein, 2010), selecting items that are relatively pervasive misconceptions held by the public about 
psychological phenomena. We used a seven point scale on which students indicated the degree to 
which they disagreed (1) or agreed (7) with 26 statements, 20 of which were misconceptions. Items 
included “we only use 10% of our brains”, “listening to Mozart increases babies’ intelligence”, 
“subliminal messages can persuade people to buy products”, “to change behaviour we must change 
attitudes” and “behaviour is influenced by moon phases”. Our instructions told participants that they 
would read a set of statements that “represent an opinion about psychological phenomena” and that 
they would “probably agree with some of the statements and disagree with others”.  
Procedure  
Participants were assessed approximately midway through the academic year. The questionnaires 
were distributed in class.  Students provided demographic information on a cover sheet, and completed 
the three scales. No identifying information was recorded. Students were reminded to read each set of 
instructions before completing the questionnaire. On all three measures, participants rated the 
statements using a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree, with a neutral rating or 4, 
‘don’t know’). 
Results 
The first aim of this study was to examine, using the PAS scale, whether endorsement of psychology 
as a science increased with experience of the subject. Cohen’s kappa for the 15 items of the PAS was 
.72. Participants’ mean scores on the PAS (scaled on the seven point scale) were 5.3 (SD = 0.7) for 
Group 1, 5.5 (SD = 0.6) for Group 2 and 5.9 (SD = 0.7) for Group 3 (see Table 1). These scores are 
significantly above the neutral rating of 4 (p < .01), indicating moderate to strong agreement that 
psychology is a science. This level of agreement is consistent with ratings reported in other studies. For 
example, Amsel et al. (2009) reported an average of 5.0 for students six weeks into an introductory 
psychology course, rising to 5.1 at the end of the semester. Friedrich (1996) reported an average score 
of 5.1 for introductory psychology students at the end of the semester and of 5.3 for students of more 
advanced psychology methods courses. Amsel, Baird and Ashley (in press) reported a PAS score of 5.7 
for senior psychology majors. A one way analysis of variance showed a significant difference in PAS 
scores among the three groups, F(2,175) = 8.9, p <. 01. Post hoc testing showed that Group 3 showed 
significantly higher PAS ratings than the two other groups.   
 
Table 1: Means, with standard deviation in parentheses, on the R-PBS, its two sub-scales (New 
Age Philosophy and Traditional Paranormal Beliefs), the PAS and agreement with the 
misconception items.  
 
 Group 1 (n = 83) Group 2 (n = 55) Group 3 ( n = 40) 
R-PBS Full scale 67.8 (23.3) 62.4 (21.44) 58.9 (19.99) 
New Age Philosophy 29.8 (11) 27.9 (10.4) 26.3 (8.9) 
Traditional Paranormal Beliefs 15.3 (6.1) 14.3 (5.7) 13.6 (6) 
PAS 5.3 (.73) 5.5 (.6) 5.9 (.73) 
Misconceptions 11.5 (3.60) 7.6 (3.8) 9.4 (3.9) 
 
Endorsement of the psychology misconceptions was computed by counting the number of 
statements students agreed with. A rating of 5 or above was taken to indicate agreement. One item was 
identified as ambiguous based on participant feedback and removed from the analysis. Table 2 shows 
the percentage of students in each group agreeing with each of the remaining 19 statements. Overall 
agreement was 61% for Group 1, 40% for Group 2 and 50% for Group 3, figures that are similar to 
previous studies. For instance, Vaughan (1977) found 39.5% agreement; Lamal (1979) reported 41%–
43%; Gardner & Dalsin (1986) reported 38% and Griggs & Ransdell (1987) reported 40%. Considering 
that our questionnaire removed items that were considered ambiguous by these and other studies, and 
that it used a 7-point scale response format, we would have expected our participants’ scores to fall at 
the upper end of these reported values. If we consider only strong agreement with the statements (a 
rating or 6 or above), total agreement falls to 40% for Group 1, 21% for Group 2 and 25% for Group 3 
(see Table 3). Overall, a majority of all three student groups agreed with 5 of the nineteen erroneous 
statements (see Table 2). 
 A one-way analysis of variance showed a significant difference between the three groups, F(2, 
177) = 21.2, p < .01. Post hoc tests showed that while Group 1 produced higher agreement with the 
misconceptions compared to both Group 2 and Group 3, the group with the lowest agreement on the 
misconceptions was Group 2.  
 
Table 2: Percentage agreement with statements on the psychology misconceptions questionnaire. 
Statements on which a majority of students agreed, in all year groups, are shown in bold. % 
agreement counts any rating above the neutral 4 response; strong agreement, a rating or 6 or 7, 
is shown in parentheses.  
 
 Group1 Group 2 Group 3 Average  
People commonly repress traumatic memories. 88 (76) 78 (56) 95 (73) 87.0 
Subliminal messages can persuade people to buy 
products. 
94 (82) 76 (53) 88 (55) 
86.0 
To change behaviour we must change attitudes. 87 (70) 73 (46) 85 (60) 81.7 
Hypnosis is a unique trance state which differs from 
waking states. 
78 (55) 60 (26) 90 (43) 
76.0 
It is easy to tell a liar by their facial expressions. 83 (52) 58 (27) 70 (35) 70.3 
Some people are left-brained, others are right-brained. 69 (52) 44 (29) 75 (43) 62.7 
Hypnosis is useful for retrieving forgotten memories. 73 (47) 47 (15) 58 (25) 59.3 
People can learn new information while they sleep. 60 (31) 46 (26) 53 (25) 53.0 
The right side of the brain is the creative side 63 (45) 35 (20) 53 (25) 50.3 
Handwriting can reveal personality traits.  63 (43) 42 (18) 45 (23) 50.0 
Dreams possess symbolic meaning. 58 (39) 46 (24) 28 (3) 44.0 
People only use 10% of their brain. 47 (30) 22 (13) 38 (23) 35.7 
80% of the brain’s potential goes unused. 46 (28) 18 (9) 43 (18) 35.7 
Dream interpretation reveals unconscious wishes. 53 (24) 33 (11) 18 (5) 34.7 
People’s responses to inkblot tests can tell us about their 
personality. 
58 (27) 18 (6) 13 (3) 
29.7 
Playing Mozart to infants boosts their intelligence. 37 (11) 26 (13) 20 (8) 27.7 
Behaviour is influenced by moon phases. 33 (17) 16 (2) 28 (0) 25.7 
Men and women have different dominant brain 
hemispheres. 
35 (13) 16 (9) 18 (3) 
23.0 
Extrasensory perception is a proven phenomenon. 27 (19) 7 (4) 25 (8) 19.7 
Average agreement  60.6 40.1 49.6 50.1 
 
Some individual items can be compared across published studies. For example, some version of the 
“to change behaviour we must change attitudes” statement is included in many studies. On our item, 
82% of students agreed with this statement. Vaughan (1977) found that 92% of her sample agreed with 
a similar item, while Lamal (1979) reported 91%, Gardner and Dalsing (1986) reported 84% and 
Griggs and Ransdell (1987) reported 76%. Green, Page, Rasekhy, and Bernhardt (2006) found that 
77% of their college student sample endorsed the statement “hypnosis is an altered state of 
consciousness, quite different from normal consciousness”. McConkey (1986) reported 62% agreeing. 
In the current study 76% of students agreed with a similar statement (“hypnosis is a unique trance state 
which differs from waking states”).  
Group 3 students were significantly more likely to agree with the statements than those in Group 2, 
t(93) = 3.3, p < .01. The proportion of neutral (4 – ‘don’t know’) responses did not differ significantly 
between the groups (at .25 in Group 2 and .21 in Group 3). Examining responses to the individual 
statements (see Table 2), it is apparent that the 5 statements that generated majority agreement overall, 
showed higher ratings in Group 3 compared to Group 2. The lower ratings in Group 2 may reflect the 
fact that the material was somewhat biased towards topics being covered in that year of the curriculum. 
This may suggest a ‘rebound effect’ whereby misconceptions that are temporarily reduced by teaching 
content are re-established once course content moves to other areas.  
 
Table 3: Correlations between scores on the PAS, R-PBS and the total number of agreements 
(with any score above 4 marked as agreement) on the misconceptions questionnaire  
 
 PAS Misconceptions 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Total R-PBS -.222* -0.06 -.204 .188 .472** .142 
New Age  
Philosophy 
-.247* -.082 -.295 .228* .441** 0 
Traditional  
Paranormal Belief 
-.124 -.0112 -.06 .206 .456** .155 
PAS 1 1 1 .086 -.22 -.148 
* correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed)  
** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed) 
 
Scores on the R-PBS did not differ by group (see Table 1). The current Irish university sample 
demonstrated lower traditional religious values and generally lower paranormal beliefs than reported 
for student samples from the United States (e.g., Roig et al. 1998; Tobacyk, 2004) and for a student and 
non-student sample in the United Kingdom (Watt, Watson & Wilson, 2007). Correlation coefficients 
for the key measures are shown in Table 3. Scores on the New Age Philosophy subscale of the R-PBS 
were positively associated with agreement with psychology misconceptions for Groups 1 and 2, but not 
for Group 3, the group with the most experience of psychology. There was no association between 
responses on the PAS and agreement with the misconceptions items.  
Discussion 
The purpose of the current study was to examine the relationships between misconceptions about 
specific knowledge areas of relevance to the discipline, beliefs about the nature of psychology as a 
discipline and the status of anti-scientific thinking in three groups of psychology students, differing in 
experience of psychology. The students’ scores on the PAS suggested moderate to strong agreement 
that psychology is a scientific discipline, and scores on the PAS were significantly higher in students 
with more academic experience of the subject. However, scores on the PAS did not correlate with 
scores on the misconceptions questionnaire. Furthermore, while agreement with misconceptions was 
lower in the two groups with more experience of psychology, the group with the most experience did 
not produce the lowest scores, and on average indicated agreement with almost half of the statements. 
This suggests that students are able to ‘compartmentalize’ and maintain popular erroneous beliefs about 
claims relevant to psychology even as their appreciation of the scientific basis for psychology as a 
discipline increases (see also Kowalski & Taylor, 2006; Miller, Wozniak, Rust, Miller, & Slezak, 
1996).  
This assumes that the PAS measures the students’ grasp of psychology as a science and that the 
students are not simply reporting what it is they think the researchers (as teachers of psychology) want 
to hear. It could be that psychology students realise that they are ‘supposed to’ report that psychology 
is a scientific discipline and that their responses are framed accordingly. If this were the case, the 
students’ continued agreement with misconceptions would not be at odds with their PAS responses. 
However, Amsel et al. (2009) had students complete the PAS from their own and their instructors’ 
perspectives and found a lower PAS score in the ‘own’ perspective condition, suggesting that students 
are not just responding to expectations when they complete the PAS. Furthermore, PAS scores predict 
psychology examination performance, suggesting that PAS scores reflect true appreciation of the basic 
assumptions of the discipline; if students were ‘giving us what we want to hear’ on the PAS scale, there 
should be no relationship to academic performance.  
Of the nineteen misconceptions analysed here, a majority of students in both groups agreed with 
five; a majority of the Group 3 students, who were approaching their final examinations, agreed with a 
further four. Agreement with the list of psychology misconceptions was significantly greater in Group 
3 compared to Group 2. This difference between the groups may reflect specific content that is taught 
in this particular psychology course at year 2. Group 2 students were less likely to agree with 
misconceptions concerning the brain, memory and perception, topics covered in that year of study. In 
fact, the four statements that found majority agreement in Group 3 but not Group 2 are specifically 
addressed in year 2 teaching. This suggests that popular misconceptions can ‘rebound’, as Group 3 
would have encountered similar course material in the previous academic year. In support of this 
suggestion, two items concerning dreams found higher agreement for Group 2 compared to Group 3, 
again reflecting content currently taught, this time for the final year students. A longitudinal analysis 
would ascertain the degree and duration of influence from current course content on misconception 
acceptance; however such analyses require students to be identified, which can be problematic for this 
type of research.   
Total scores on the New Age Philosophy scale of the R-PBS were associated with higher agreement 
with psychology misconceptions for Groups 1 and 2, but there was no relationship between R-PBS 
scores and agreement with misconceptions in Group 3. If the paranormal beliefs subscales of the R-
PBS are taken as a measure of anti-scientific thinking, then this correlation for Group 2, in the context 
of lower misconception agreement overall, could indicate a relationship between endorsement of 
misconceptions and poorer scientific thinking in spite of current course material. In Group 3, the higher 
agreement with the misconceptions overall suggests that popular misconceptions regain a foothold 
once they are not being countered in current course materials; in this case a measure of anti-scientific 
thinking does not predict who will be susceptible to these myths.  
There was a negative correlation between scores on the PAS and on the R-PBS and its New Age 
Philosophy subscale for Group 1 students, that is, those students who have recently commenced the 
study of psychology. This relationship is not evident in the groups with more experience of the subject. 
This may reflect an attitude towards psychology in those drawn to it as a subject but who do not 
continue with it, either by choice or because they do not produce the required examination performance 
to continue. 
Identifying the misconceptions that are particularly prevalent may be useful in pointing to areas 
where teaching might focus additional attention (Gardner & Dalsing, 1986). The five statements that 
generated agreement of a majority of students in all groups are classic popular misconceptions, and are 
ranked here in order of average agreement across the three groups:  
 
1. People commonly repress traumatic memories (87%); 
2. Subliminal messages can persuade people to buy products (86%); 
3. To change behaviour we must change attitudes (82%); 
4. Hypnosis is a unique trance state which differs from waking states (76%); 
5. It is easy to tell a liar by their facial expressions (70%).  
 
The Group 3 students, who were approaching their final year examinations, produced majority 
agreement on a further four statements, ranked here in order of average agreement for that group:  
 
1. Some people are left-brained, others are right-brained (75%); 
2. Hypnosis is useful for retrieving forgotten memories (58%); 
3. The right side of the brain is the creative side (53%); 
4. People can learn new information while they sleep (53%).  
 
Many of these misconceptions, and the psychological evidence against them, are discussed by 
Lilienfeld, Lynn, Ruscio and Beyerstein (2010). Some of these statements are obviously false, even to 
those without training in psychology, and yet their pervasiveness in folk psychology sees them readily 
agreed with. For example, an introductory psychology student could readily provide challenges to the 
statement, “to change behaviour we must change attitudes”, and yet, psychology students in this study, 
as in other studies, agree with the statement, when it is presented in this form. Do they really agree with 
this statement? Or are responses biased by the format and language used? Or are we seeing a non-
scientific mode of thinking being applied to ‘folk psychology’ issues? Similarly, the statement “people 
commonly repress traumatic memories” might generate agreement because of the ambiguity created by 
the word ‘commonly’ – what exactly do we mean by ‘common’ here? Do students read this statement 
as something more akin to “repression of memory is possible”? Many of the nineteen statements used 
(see Table 2) could be criticised on similar grounds; this difficulty with devising a list of clearly and 
unambiguously erroneous statements has been noted throughout the literature (e.g., see Brown, 1984; 
Griggs & Ransdell, 1987).  
Assuming that endorsement of misconceptions reflects faulty reasoning of some type, how might 
we change this type of thinking? Some studies support the benefits of a refutational approach in 
countering students’ common sense beliefs about psychology (Kowalski & Taylor, 2009). Miller, 
Wozniak, Rust, Miller and Slezak (1996) found that students changed their inaccurate beliefs about 
psychology as they were required to write an essay that contradicted those beliefs. However, most 
studies to date have only measured short term reduction in such misconceptions; our data suggest a 
‘rebound’ effect that requires longer-term investigation. Furthermore, as noted by Lilienfeld (2010), 
debunking misconceptions in the classroom has its risks; sometimes students remember the 
misconception but not the source or the ‘negation tag’ telling them that the statement is inaccurate; in 
such cases misconceptions might be strengthened rather than eradicated.  
Other approaches advocate targeting student misconceptions by presenting their beliefs about the 
discipline in a coherent and consistent manner and allowing the students to refine the competing beliefs 
(e.g., Amsel et al., 2009; Lilienfeld, 2010). However, Zachar and Leong (1992) suggest the 
appreciation of scientific method comes down to personality – teaching may not change this. It may be 
that students have multiple belief systems and adapt their thinking according to context (Amsel et al., 
2009), in which case direct and repeated challenges to psycho-myths may be essential for their 
eradication.  
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